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Abstract. Work is focused on a gas company that wishes to 
develop a better understanding of its safety culture and identify 
potential enhancement opportunities. The hypothesis that 
emerged from an exploratory phase of work suggests that the 
corporate restructuring initiated four years ago, which has 
divided the company into distinct business units, has reduced 
organizational reliability. This issue raises a question faced by 
most industrial organizations, namely the trade-off between 
productivity and safety. On the one hand, streamlining activities 
offers an opportunity to save money, particularly through 
economies of scale and employee specialization. On the other 
hand maintaining flexibility generates costs, but provides a 
defence against silo effects, which are detrimental to safety. 
This paper describes how the company was restructured and 
the effects on risk management. The aim is to better 
understand the effects of the rationalisation on organizational 
reliability and performance, in order to identify potential 
solutions that may limit any counter-productive impacts.  
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
This article examines the safety culture of a major gas company, and 
potential ways to enhance its safety culture and safety results. The research 
project is carried out in partnership with a major company in the gas sector, 
whose mission is to transport and distribute natural gas at medium and low 
pressure from the network to the end user.  
Research is focused on events that degrade safety performance and the 
conditions under which they occur. The initial phase consisted of participant 
observation (at the company’s headquarters) and (on-site) non-participant 
observation, combined with semi-structured interviews. This phase revealed 
that the corporate restructuring exercise, which had begun four years earlier, 
had profoundly transformed the company’s work. Restructuring consisted of 
dividing gas distribution activities into distinct entities, with the consequence 
that each entity covered a wider geographical area and the work of 
employees became more specialized.  
The initial phase of research led to the hypothesis that the corporate 
restructuring had deteriorated organizational reliability. This article therefore 
examines the following question: what was the impact of corporate 
restructuring on organizational reliability and performance? The answer 
should help shed more light on a situation faced by most industrial 
organizations, namely the trade-off between productivity and safety.  
We begin with a description of the organization in its current state and the 
impact of this structure on work. We then examine the issues in detail and 
outline the methodology, before finally presenting some initial findings.  
2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The question which arises from the initial phase of research is: why has this 
corporate restructuring had an impact on its ability to manage risks?  
After quickly presenting the organizational context, we outline some of the 
answers provided by the safety science literature. Next, we put forward a 
hypothesis related to changes in the nature of risk and the work of those who 
have to deal with it on the ground, namely field operators. Finally, we 
present our methodology.  
2.1 Organizational context  
The corporate restructuring has resulted in the division of gas distribution 
activities into four departments: network operations (BEX); planning (CAPA); 
actual field operations divided into routine maintenance (ARG) and 
specialized operations (MSG). In the new structure each employee is linked to 
a single functional group, and is expected to routinely carry out a clearly-
defined set of tasks related to a particular aspect of the project.  
Specifically, in terms of day-to-day activities this led to both a simplification 
of “real” work (employees carried out a limited range of simplified tasks more 
often) and increased the time spent on administration, which became 
necessary in order to coordinate the work of the various departments 
(Dujarier, 2006). If we take a definition of the organization of work as, “a 
dynamic set of responses to contradictions” (Pagès et al., 1979) 
administration describes the need to integrate individual actions, which has 
become necessary at all levels, including that of field workers, on whom 
research focuses (along with the relationship with their direct supervisors). 
As far as they are concerned this is due mostly to an increase in the meta-
work they must take care of, i.e. familiarising themselves with procedures 
and tracking activities (reporting, providing feedback, etc.).  
2.2 Division of Activity, Risk Homeostasis and the Silo Effect 
The safety science literature provides some useful approaches to 
understanding the effect of the corporate restructuring on the company’s 
safety performance.  
In normal (functional) mode, where there are no hazards to manage, the new 
division of responsibilities seems to undermine the resilience of the socio-
technical system. There is a decrease in individual vigilance, as each worker 
tends to rely on his colleagues, in a way that is consistent with the principle 
of risk homeostasis (Wilde, 1988, see section 4.2). Moreover, it has created a 
silo effect within the organization. This makes it impossible to maintain an 
overview of ongoing projects and operations and degrades individual and 
collective effectiveness, making it more difficult for everyone to take the 
constraints of their colleagues into account in their daily work.  This is an 
example of the negative impact the silo effect has on safety – and the limited 
awareness effect that it creates (Hopkins, 2006).  
In dysfunctional, hazard management mode, these negative effects are 
compounded by the need for a rapid response to contain risk (Knegtering and 
Pasman, 2009). Various factors slow down the company’s ability to respond. 
These include: decentralization of decision-making and ability to take action; 
identification of the most appropriate interlocutor; different working 
practices / vocabulary in different departments (which slows down mutual 
understanding); need to arbitrate between the priorities and constraints of 
departments; etc. In other words, the proliferation of sub-systems within the 
organization acts as a brake on action (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977).  
2.3 The Managerialisation of Field Workers for Risk Management 
What’s more, as risks have become both pervasive and chronically 
unpredictable (see e.g. Beck, 2001; Mignard and Terssac, 2011), they cannot 
be fully anticipated during preparatory work. Therefore, when unforeseen 
risks arise once work has begun, it is the field operators who are actually 
there who have to deal with the situation. In this perspective, risk 
management means identifying emerging risks, analysing the underlying 
causes and making the appropriate decision. Effective risk management is 
therefore based on the worker’s capacity to go beyond their formal role of 
operator and on their ability to pay proactive attention to their environment, 
carry out a context analysis and make sensible decisions. However, such roles 
and skills are traditionally expected of managers (Mintzberg, 1973), not field 
operators.  It also means that the operators must base their actions on a 
clear understanding of the cause of the problem and that they are able to 
articulate why they chose to take such action. On a practical level, it emerged 
from semi-structured interviews that this was the main characteristic of a 
“good gasman”, while at a theoretical level it refers to the exercise of 
practical reason as described by Paul Ricœur (Ricœur, 1986).  
Our first hypothesis was that corporate restructuring had had an impact on 
organizational resilience, which led to an examination of risk management at 
the organizational level. Subsequent research led to a second hypothesis, 
which is that effective risk management must rely on the managerialisation 
of field operators. However, the current practice of confining field operators 
to a strictly operational role, which has been reinforced by the corporate 
restricting, prevents this managerialisation and therefore degrades 
organizational reliability.  
2.4 Methodology  
Research was mainly based on observational techniques that combined non-
participant observation in the maintenance department (within operational 
teams) and participant observation at the company’s headquarters.  
Observational techniques were chosen as they avoid the filter of discursive 
constructions and make it possible to capture simultaneously the technical 
and cognitive practices of agents (Arborio, 1999; Thiétard, 2007). The method 
involved making direct observations of the way in which projects were 
“framed” at briefings (i.e. the information volunteered by the supervisor); 
how workers prepared for work; what happened when they arrived on-site; 
their behaviour throughout the duration of the operation; what provoked 
discussions with colleagues (operators usually work in pairs) and potentially 
supervisors, and the nature of these discussions; etc.  
The aim is ultimately to apply a ricœurien approach based on the concept of 
practical reason (ibid.), which is founded on ideas of “motivation”, 
“rationale”, “attitudes” and “practical reasoning”. The value of taking this 
approach lies in the ability it provides to analyse the actions of field operators 
in their own terms, i.e. in the context of their own configuration and dynamic 
(and not only in their relation to procedures and external constraints, as is 
frequently the case), while retaining the ability to link these actions to the 
(notably organizational) context, in which they originate.  
Participant observation is ongoing. A particularly useful exercise was 
participation in post-incident analyses, a procedure that had been 
established by the company four years earlier (Desmorat et al., 2013).  
3 INITIAL RESULTS 
The analysis of the following incident focuses on the impact of corporate 
restructuring on risk management. It describes the impact of the new 
organization on on-site project management. 
3.1 The Overlooked Bypass  
During operations to replace a length of pipe, failure to install a bypass led to 
the gas supply to hundreds of customers being cut off.  
This oversight was the result of a failure to prepare. While preparing the 
project, an employee in the engineering department had handwritten 
“bypass?” on the plans. A bypass is necessary when the network has an 
“antenna” topology, i.e. the rest of the network is only supplied from one 
side, unlike a “mesh” topology where the rest of the network is supplied from 
both sides. In this case, the bypass maintains the mains gas supply to both 
sides of the section where the work is done.  
The employee in the operations department who was responsible for the 
case did not see the hand-written note, assumed that the network was a 
mesh configuration (the most common situation), consequently did not run a 
check with mapping tools and did not therefore recommend the use of a 
bypass. The employee in the maintenance department who was in charge of 
site preparation did not therefore provide the equipment necessary for the 
work to be carried out.  
On-site work was carried out by a service company. Once the supply to the 
segment had been cut, they did not check the gas pressure on each side (a 
required procedure involving the installation of balloons that check gas 
pressure). They did not even have the necessary equipment, having assumed 
in the absence of any indication to the contrary that the network must be a 
mesh. Complaints about a cut in gas supplies began to arrive shortly after the 
gas had been turned off (any gas remaining in the pipeline is rapidly used 
when the part of the network no longer being supplied is cut off), which led 
to the realization that an error had occurred.  
 
 
3.2 Lessons Learned  
As this case demonstrates, it was not one single event (a lack of gas-pressure 
balloons, a stuck valve, etc.) but a series of events that led to the incident. It 
seems clear that in these situations, not only did barriers not play a defensive 
role (Reason, 1990) but they also made it more difficult to manage the 
incident.  
The separation of the engineering department and the operations 
department and the fact that employees did not know each other led to a 
reliance on a written note rather than checking in person. The operations 
department relied on the fact that the file had been prepared by the 
engineering department, and decided that it was therefore not necessary to 
check the network configuration. Similarly, the operator carrying out the 
work decided that pressure testing was not necessary; the fact that there was 
no bypass and the lack of any specific indicators about the network 
configuration was considered sufficient information.  
What’s more, classical communication theory argues that successful 
communication depends on the correspondence between the message sent 
by the transmitter and that received by the receiver. The quality of the match 
depends on the quality of the channel through which the message flows and 
the ability of stakeholders to use the same codes to encode/decode the 
message and ultimately, to understand the same thing. As signs (in this case, 
mostly words) are essentially polysemic, they must be interpreted (Ricœur, 
1986). If the interpretation is to be correct, (i.e. the selected meaning is the 
one which the transmitter wanted to convey) there must be a common 
reference point, which can only be established on the basis of shared 
experience. Moreover, the finding that interpersonal relationships are 
necessary for successful workplace communication is confirmed by 
ergonomics research (Karsenty and Le Quellec, 2009).  
It can therefore be argued that the lack of interpersonal relationships, 
whether the result of a recent appointment or simply a lack of contact 
(brought about by the corporate restructuring) makes it impossible to 
establish the common references necessary for successful communication.  
As such, it constitutes degraded conditions for risk management.  
4 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Based on initial results of the on-site observation and the overlooked by-pass 
incident, it is possible to identify two principal adverse effects of corporate 
restructuring. The first concerns the impossibility of establishing a common 
reference point, as there are few or no shared experiences at the functional 
level (the silo effect) and the human level (geographic separation). This then 
triggers the organizational risk homeostasis phenomenon, which encourages 
employees to rely on checks carried out by their colleagues (i.e. other 
barriers found in the defence system).  
The identification of these effects can help to suggest actions to counteract 
the negative effects of corporate restructuring and restore – or even enhance 
– organizational resilience. The ultimate goal is to create conditions that lead 
to the emergence of a shared framework and “organizational intelligence”, 
which at the same time maintains the risk management benefits offered by 
the technical specialization of employees and the implementation of defence 
systems, hence helping optimize the trade-off between the separation of 
activities/employee specialization and the maintenance of flexibility.  
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